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Public pension systems have been much criticized, but their details 
have been studied relatively little. Studies of federal pension plans have 
revealed substantial accumulations of unfunded liabilities facing future 
taxpayers, and both government and private studies of state and local 
pension plans have indicated that these problems are common, though 
not universal, in lower-level jurisdictions as well. But while there have 
been some studies of the aggregate impacts of these plans, little atten- 
tion has been paid to the level and form of the incentives they create. 
The differences across jurisdictions are frequently quite dramatic. The 
level and timing of pension benefits and of the accrual of pension rights 
by employees-and  the work incentives thereby created-are  strikingly 
variable across plans. Our primary purpose in what follows is to de- 
scribe that variation and give some insight into its sources. We  will not 
explicitly concern ourselves with developing a theory to account for 
the observed facts, but neither will we wholly resist the tendency of 
some of the more remarkable facts to speak for themselves about theory. 
We examine 94 local employee public pension plans from thirty-three 
states. Of these, 67 cover general employees or teachers, and 27 cover 
police or fire employees. Some plans are state-administered; most are 
locally administered. The plans we describe are among those investi- 
gated in Arnold (1983); they represent a subset for which there were 
adequate data to conduct our examination. These systems cover more 
than  2.9 million employees.'  The plans  do not  represent a random 
sample, so the statistics we will cite should be taken as roughly indic- 
ative rather than precisely descriptive. 
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This chapter describes the character and variety of public pension 
plans, examines the roles played by certain features of these plans, 
and assesses their relative importance. We focus on the time profile of 
pension wealth and wealth accruals. Pension wealth accrual is the in- 
crement to a worker’s wealth in a given year as a result of  increases 
in pension rights granted in that year, just as conventionally measured 
labor income is the increase in a worker’s wealth resulting from wages 
and salaries. Pension wealth accruals are thus an element of total worker 
compensation; to understand the time profile and consequent incentive 
effects of public compensation, we need to understand the time profile 
of pension accruals. 
Our work parallels research of Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) describing 
private sector plans. Aside from the fact that public sector plans cover 
large numbers of  employees, there are two (possibly contradictory) 
reasons why we might be interested in looking at these plans. First, 
they may have different labor market properties or be determined by 
different factors than private sector plans. Second, because these plans 
are not covered  by  federal pension  law, they  represent  a less con- 
strained and therefore richer universe of possible features. 
9.1  Some Features of the Plans 
Form. All of the plans we are examining are defined benefit plans- 
pensions are determined by formula, typically related to years of ser- 
vice and to salary in the last year or last few years before retirement. 
Nearly all of our plans have formulas of the form 
Pension  = BAR  x  YOS  x  SALAVG, 
where BAR is the benefit accrual rate; YOS,  the years of service; and 
SALAVG, the average salary received in  a specified number of  years 
prior to retirement. Three- and five-year final salary averaging are the 
most common, though pensions based only on salary in the last year 
are not uncommon in our plans.  A few plans have two- or four-year 
final salary averaging; one plan averages salaries in the final ten years. 
Benefit  accrual  rates. In  general, these  plans  appear to be more 
generous than private sector plans. While Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) 
describe a typical private plan as having a benefit accrual rate  (the 
percentage of  average final earnings that the worker receives per year 
of service) of 1 percent, rates in public plans with a single rate ranged 
from 1 percent to 3.33 percent, with a mean of  1.9 percent and a mode 
and median of 2 percent. About three-fifths of the plans had some ceiling 
on accrual of benefits. 
Cost-ofliving increases. Nearly half of  the plans have explicit pro- 
vision for a cost-of-living (COL) increase to pensioners. The provisions 217  Incentive Structures of Local Public Pension Plans 
are generally far less generous than the full CPI increase of federal 
retirement systems and Social Security; four-fifths of these plans cap 
COL increases at 3 percent or less per year, and a few also have caps 
on the total COL adjustment a retiree may receive over the length of 
the pension.  Only a half-dozen  plans  are explicitly  integrated with 
Social Security. 
Vesting. Vesting in some public plans contrasts sharply with that in 
private plans covered by ERISA. Nine of our plans have no vesting at 
all-workers  become entitled to the pension  at the same time they 
become eligible to begin drawing it. Eight of these are police or fire 
plans. Seven others have vesting of twenty years or more; five of these 
cover police or fire employees. Thus  13 of the 27 policehire plans in 
our group have no vesting or very long vesting, while only 3 of 67 
general plans do. Among the remaining plans, vesting ranges from one 
to fifteen years, with ten years being typical. All but three plans have 
“cliff”  vesting-that  is, workers receive full entitlement to a pension 
in a single year. 
Early retirement. The contrast between policehre and general plans 
is also striking with respect to early retirement.  Only a third of the 
police/fire plans have a provision for a reduced pension before normal 
retirement age, while more than three-quarters of  the general plans 
have such a provision. The difference is no doubt related to the gen- 
erally earlier normal retirement age in policehre plans: the mean age 
for unreduced retirement for someone entering one of these plans at 
age 25 is 51, while the mean age for Jirst retirement (reduced or un- 
reduced) in  general plans  is over  54,  and for unreduced  retirement 
almost 59. 
Eligibility for benefits. Only twenty-two of  the plans have age-only 
requirements for full retirement (or age-only plus vesting), and only 
four, all policehre plans, have service-only requirements. The remain- 
der have various age and service combinations. 
9.2  Methodology 
Our approach to analyzing these plans was to calculate wealth and 
accruals for a single hypothetical worker. We chose a worker who enters 
the system at age twenty-five. Using a single worker rather than some 
composite of various ages gives a clearer picture of incentive patterns. 
As we will illustrate later, however, the time profile can change mark- 
edly when different assumptions are made about entry age. The profiles 
that we present, therefore, should not be considered as complete char- 
acterizations of  the plans in question, but rather as illustrative of the 
ways in which varying plan provisions  can produce different effects 
on similar individuals. 218  Howard L. FrantlHerman B. Leonard 
In  order to make  these calculations,  we  must  make  assumptions 
about the real interest rate, the inflation rate, the real rate of  salary 
growth associated with increased experience, and the real rate of gen- 
eral wage increase in the economy. We used 3 percent as the real interest 
rate and 5 percent as the inflation rate. To put all plans on a comparable 
basis, we used the same assumed salary growth trajectory for every 
plan. Experience growth rates were assumed to be the same as in the 
federal civil service, as reported by the Office of Personnel Management 
(1980). These rates range from 5.5 percent at age 25, to 2.2 percent at 
45, to 1.1 percent at 65. In addition, we assumed a real annual growth 
rate of 0.6 percent in general salary levels over time; this is consistent 
with assumptions used for federal workers by OPM. 
The pension is an annuity whose expected duration equals the pen- 
sioner’s expected remaining life from the date he or she begins receiving 
benefits2 The value of that annuity will differ across plans, depending 
on their provisions for cost-of-living  increase^.^ We  take the value of 
pension  wealth in  any given year to be  the value  of  pension  rights 
acquired up to that point-in  effect, the value of  the rights a worker 
would have if  he left his job in that year. Thus, a worker who is not 
vested has pension wealth of zero. A worker who leaves after becoming 
vested, but before she qualifies to begin collecting a pension, has a 
future right whose value must be discounted to the present. The ap- 
propriate discount factor is (almost always) the nominal discount rate, 
since the vested pension  right is granted (almost always) in  nominal 
terms. Given that a worker has departed (call it either resignation or 
retirement) but is not yet eligible to begin collecting a pension, from 
what  year  should we  discount pension  rights  to arrive at a present 
value? One answer would be to discount the pension from the year in 
which one first becomes eligible to begin receiving it. In some plans, 
though, age-based early retirement penalties are large enough to make 
it worthwhile, in present value terms, for a retiree to wait one or more 
years after initial eligibility before starting to receive a pension. A fully 
rational retiree will wait to begin receiving payments until the optimal 
year, that is, the year that the pension annuity has its highest present 
value.4 (Note that  taking  account of  this makes the accrual profile 
smoother than it would appear in a naive model that assumes someone 
leaving work will take a pension as soon as it becomes available.) The 
optimal year is, of course, sensitive to starting age and discount rate 
assumptions. 
The product of the benefit accrual rate, years of service, early re- 
tirement  reduction factor (if  any), final  salary averaging factor, and 
annuity factor is equal to pension wealth as a fraction (or multiple) of 
current salary. This number times cumulative real salary growth gives 
pension wealth as a fraction (multiple) of age-25 salary. Although we 219  Incentive Structures of Local Public Pension Plans 
will give some results in terms of current salary, most of our discussion 
will be in terms of age-25 salary. We prefer to avoid using current salary 
as a metric because it does not capture one of the sources of pension 
wealth increases: increases in the salary base from which pensions are 
calculated. Using a reference point that represents a$xed  number of 
real dollars, such as salary at age twenty-five (or any other age), thus 
gives a truer picture of a pension plan’s incentive profile. 
Accruals are calculated directly from pension wealth. We  are inter- 
ested in accruals as a component of labor income. What does this imply 
about  the relationships between wealth and accruals?  Think  of  the 
analogous situation for a defined contribution plan-that  is, for a plan 
that  consists  of  an actual account for each employee. In a defined 
contribution plan, the accrual would simply be whatever amount was 
deposited in the account that year. But the account balance would also 
increase as a result of the interest earnings on the funds already in- 
vested. Thus, 
PW, = PW,-, x  (1 + r) + ACCt, 
where r  is the  real rate of  return in  the  economy. The appropriate 
definition of the accrual in a defined benefit plan  should be just the 
same. If at the end of the fifteenth year an employee has accumulated 
pension wealth of $100,000 and the real rate of return is 3 percent, then 
by the end of the sixteenth year she will have pension wealth of $103,OoO; 
any difference (positive or negative) is that year’s accrual. The correct 
baseline from which to assess the annual accrual is thus the preceding 
year’s pension wealth adjusted upward by the real rate of interest. We 
therefore define accruals as the increase in wealth from one year to 
the next above the increase due to interest on existing wealth. 
For the six plans with Social Security integration, replacement rates 
were approximated using data for technical  and clerical workers in 
service industries.5 Because of computational complications, the op- 
timal  year  to begin collecting a pension  in  these plans was  simply 
assumed to be the first available year. This assumption appears to have 
little effect on any of the results. 
9.3  Accrual Profiles: What Creates Them? 
A striking fact about pension accrual profiles is that they often include 
“spikes”  or discontinuities. In a particular year, the accrual may in- 
crease sharply over the previous  year,  then  decline as sharply the 
following year. These features are costly and have potentially  large 
incentive effects, and it seems unlikely that the time profile of wages 
exhibits similar features in either the same or the offsetting direction. 
As Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) noted, these facts are difficult to reconcile 220  Howard L. Frant/Herman B. Leonard 
with  a  spot-market view  of  labor,  in  which  workers  are paid  their 
marginal product at each point in time. 
What plan features create these spikes? Briefly, spikes are created 
by discontinuous or discrete assignment of pension rights. The simplest 
example is initial vesting, which we refer to as “primary” vesting. The 
sudden assignment  of a right to a deferred pension, where no such 
right existed before, creates a one-year jump in accruals. The size of 
this spike depends both on the size of the deferred pension being awarded 
and on how far in the future benefits will be collected. The latter point 
implies larger vesting spikes not only for those plans with relatively 
early retirement, but also for those with relatively late vesting. As we 
will see, the effects can be dramatic. 
There are other pension rights, however, that may be vested later 
than the primary vesting of basic entitlements. We  refer to vesting of 
such additional entitlements as “secondary vesting.”  One example is 
the right to begin collecting a pension early at a reduced rate.6 Whether 
pension accrual at the reduced retirement date is discontinuous depends 
on whether the right is assigned discretely. An “early retirement spike” 
is not created by the mere existence of an option for reduced retirement 
at some age. What creates a spike is that in the previous year, the only 
vested right that existed was to retire at some later age. 
For instance, the first part of figure 9.1 shows the Denver police and 
fire plan, in which at age 49 the worker has a vested right to retire at 
65. The following year he is awarded the right to retire immediately 
(although at a reduced pension). This creates an accrual at age 50 which 
is dramatically higher than that at 49 or 5 1. Note that the presence of 
an early retirement penalty keeps accruals substantially positive after 
the reduced retirement age of 50, even though in this example the final 
salary percentage reaches its ceiling at age 50. In contrast, the second 
part of figure 9.1 shows the Danbury, Connecticut, plan in which the 
worker in the year before reduced retirement has a vested right to retire 
the following year  (age 55). (In this case the optimal year to begin 
collecting the pension is actually age 58, but that is not the essential 
feature here.) There is no discontinuity between age 54 and age 55. 
There may, of course, still be a discontinuity on the other side, if  the 
worker gets most of  the value of  the pension in the year of  reduced 
retirement. But early retirement penalties can go far toward smoothing 
out this discontinuity, as in this example. Among the plans we studied 
that have a reduced retirement feature, those permitting deferral to the 
reduced retirement date, and therefore not having a spike at that date, 
outnumber those with a spike by about 3 to 2. 
Secondary vesting features have in common what we call accelera- 
tion: they  result  in  some vested right moving nearer to the present. 
The early  retirement spike discussed above is one example. In this 221  Incentive Structures of Local Public Pension Plans 
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case, we have fuff  acceleration-that  is, moving of a vested right all 
the way to the present. In the public plans we examined, partial ac- 
celeration was also an important cause of spikes in accrual patterns. 
This occurs in some plans with several age-service combinations for 
retirement. For example, a plan might permit retirement at age 60 with 
10 years of service, or at 55 with 25 years of service. In some plans 
this means that a person with 25 years of service can leave and take 
with him the right to begin collecting a pension at age 55.'  Since in the 
previous year he had only the less valuable right to collect a pension 
at 60, we observe a spike in the accrual at 25 years of service, repre- 
senting the difference in value of  those two rights. Another example 
would be a person eligible at 55 for a pension reduced, say, 5 percent 222  Howard L. Frantmerman B. Leonard 
for each year before 65, who at 60 becomes eligible for a full pension 
under a different age-service combination. One can think of  this situ- 
ation either as a sudden increase in the benefit amount, or as a sudden 
acceleration in the date of full retirement. The two dimensions of  full 
or reduced retirement and full or partial acceleration give four possi- 
bilities, any of which may create an accrual spike-and  each of which 
is represented somewhere in the public plans we examined. 
Finally, we  should take note of  other features that affect  accrual 
profiles. As one might expect, the bene$t  accrual  rate-the  number 
that is multiplied by years of  service to give the pension as a fraction 
of final average salary-affects  the level but not the shape of the accrual 
profile. Figure 9.2 shows two Pennsylvania counties with plans that 
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are identical in structure but have different rates. A change in the benefit 
accrual rate in midcareer will create a kink in the accrual profile, but 
this effect is usually small. Early retirement penalties will increase the 
difference in pension  wealth between  one year and the next.  Thus, 
they will make accruals more positive. BeneJit  ceilings will have the 
opposite effect: by reducing the gain from staying another year they 
will make accruals more negative. 
9.4  Types of  Accrual Profiles 
The ninety-four plans we have studied display a broad range of ac- 
crual profiles. We  found it convenient to group them into four broad 
categories. 
The “simple”  type displays a primary vesting spike and then rela- 
tively smooth accruals up to the date of full retirement, followed by a 
drop-off if the age of full retirement is before sixty-five. (This includes 
some plans in which there are reduced retirement provisions, but eli- 
gibility for reduced retirement occurs at primary vesting, so that there 
is no further discontinuity.) There are twenty-two such plans in our 
sample. Plans  with this classic pattern can  still exhibit tremendous 
variation in timing and levels of accruals, however, and can thus look 
strikingly different. Figure 9.3 shows the accrual patterns for Oregon; 
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Wayne County, Michigan; Indiana police and fire; and Chicago. The 
Oregon and Wayne County plans show small primary vesting spikes 
followed by smoothly increasing accruals over a long period, with those 
in Wayne County considerably larger. Both the Indiana police/fire and 
Chicago plans have late primary vesting and as a consequence have 
dramatically larger initial spikes. The Chicago plan then has a longer 
period with higher continuing accruals. Oregon and Chicago both show 
a flattening of the slope of the accrual profile after reduced retirement; 
the other two have no provision for reduced retirement. Even within 
the simple accrual pattern, then, the plans we examined showed enor- 
mous variation. 
A more common form of accrual pattern is a primary vesting spike 
with one secondary vesting spike. There are forty-eight plans in this 
category.  Again, plans  with  these essential features may  look  very 
different. Figure 9.4 shows patterns for Washington State and Lansing, 
Michigan, police and fire. The Washington plan has almost negligible 
spikes, while the Lansing police and fire plan has dramatic spikes for 
both primary and secondary vesting. Conversely, plans may look sim- 
ilar in their accrual profiles as a result of quite different provisions. For 
example, figure 9.5 shows that New York State, Grand Rapids police 
and fire, and Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, appear similar, yet the 
secondary spike is produced in the first case by a one-time retroactive 
increase in  the benefit accrual rate  (an unusual  mechanism), in  the 
second case by a conventional “early retirement”  mechanism, and in 
the third by a partial acceleration of full retirement from sixty to fifty- 
five. We  might also include in this category some plans such as those 
in figure 9.6 (Fresno, California, and Phoenix, Arizona), where a no- 
ticeable discontinuity is produced, in the first case, by a drop in the 
benefit accrual rate or, in the second case, by a ceiling on it. This is a 
close call, though, because such provisions do not produce spikes in 
the sense of a discontinuity on both sides of the year in question. 
A third class is the “pot of gold at the end of the rainbow” group. 
In these plans, essentially all of the pension wealth  is awarded in a 
single year, producing spikes that go far off the scale we are using here. 
Two examples, from San Antonio, Texas, and Birmingham, Alabama, 
are in figure 9.7. We  found six such plans, five of them for police and/ 
or fire fighters. 
Finally, we have eighteen plans that exhibit various sorts of multiple 
spikes or other marked discontinuities. Examples are shown in figure 
9.8, which shows the plans of the Lansing, Michigan, Board of Water 
and Light; Minnesota; Mobile, Alabama, police and fire; and Memphis, 
Tennessee.  These  spikes are most often produced  by interaction of 
various age-service requirements, but as the examples show, they may 
also result from benefit accrual ceilings, discontinuous early retirement 225  Incentive Structures of  Local Public Pension Plans 
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reductions, discrete accruals, and other features. Examining each of 
these plans in turn will help show how the factors operate. 
In the case of Lansing Water and Light, the spike at 35  is 10-year vest- 
ing with pension benefits startingat age 60. At 40, this worker has 15 years 
and becomes eligible for reduced retirement at age 55. At 50, the worker 
has 25 years and reduced retirement is accelerated from 55 to 50-that 
is, there is full acceleration of reduced retirement benefits. Finally, at 55 
the worker has 30 years of service, and full retirement is accelerated from 
60 to 55-there  is full acceleration of full retirement benefits. 226  Howard L. FranUHerman B. Leonard 
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The Minnesota plan has both vesting of the right to retire at age 55 and 
an increase in the benefit accrual rate (from 2 percent to 2.5  percent) after 
10 years (age 35 for our illustrative worker). At age 55 there is eligibility 
for reduced retirement. This eligibility does not produce a discontinuity, 
however, because at vesting (and at age 54) the worker is eligible to leave 
and collect a reduced pension at 55. But our illustrative worker reaches 
30 years of service at age 55, so the reduction is calculated not based on 
number of years before age 65 but on number of years before 62. This 
jump from one reduction schedule to another creates a spike. Finally, at 
age 58, the worker's age plus service equals 90, so he is able to  jump from 
the higher early retirement schedule to full retirement. 
The Mobile police and fire plan grants 50 percent of final salary after 
20 years, 52.5 percent after 25 years, 55 percent after 30 years, and 60 
percent after 35 years. Full retirement is possible at age 55. Note that 
accruals become dramatically negative after age 55, except in year 35 
(age 60). 
Memphis, Tennessee, has vesting at 10 years. At 25 years (age 50) 
there is an acceleration of the full-retirement age from 65 to 62. At age 
55 there is a reduced-retirement spike, caused by acceleration from full 
retirement at 62 to reduced retirement at 55. The accruals are slightly 
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worker receives full retirement  (age 60  with  30  years) and simulta- 
neously reaches the benefit accrual ceiling (35 years). The result is a 
dramatic drop-off in accruals to significantly negative numbers. 
The plans we have examined, then, create an extremely wide range of 
accrual profiles and use a broad range of instruments to  form them. Even 
those that are quite similar in kind may differ dramatically in degree. 
It is worth noting that, despite the wide variations in accrual profiles 
described above, there are certain types of profiles we never observed. 
For example, none of the plans we examined had accrual profiles that 
were downward sloping, or even level, in real dollar terms. 228  Howard L. Frant/Herman B. Leonard 
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9.5  What Is Interesting about These Profiles? 
9.5.1  Wealth: Large, Convergent 
Figure 9.9 shows the distribution across plans of  pension wealth at 
five-year intervals, compounded forward to age sixty-five for compar- 
ability. Three things are striking about the wealth results. 
First, the numbers are large. As noted earlier, these plans have large 
benefits relative to private plans.  The mean value of pension wealth 
at age sixty-five in our plans is 24 times age-25 salary, with a standard 229  Incentive Structures of Local Public Pension Plans 
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deviation of about 6 times age-25 salary. Converted to normal costs 
(that is, divided by the cumulated compounded value of salary), this 
translates to a mean of 15.4 percent and a one-standard-deviation range 
of  11.7 percent  to  19.2 percent.  Kotlikoff  and  Wise  (1984), using 
slightly different actuarial assumptions, calculate that a typical private 
pension,  by  contrast, represents  2.6 percent  to 7.2 percent  of  dis- 
counted salary, depending on retirement date. It should be recalled, 
of course, that workers in many of our plans are not covered by Social 
Security. 
Second, wealth tends to peak before age sixty-five. While accruals 
to wealth are generally positive up until the age of full retirement, they 
quickly drop and become negative thereafter. 
Finally, the wealth associated with different plans tends to converge 
with increasing age-plans  differ less in where they end up than in how 
they get there. At age forty-five, for instance, the standard deviation 
of pension wealth is 76 percent of the mean; by age sixty-five it is only 
24 percent. 
9.5.2  Big Spikes 
In our sample, 25 of  27 police/fire plans and 28 of 67 non-police/fire 
plans had at least one spike in excess of 100% of  current salary. Thirteen 230  Howard L. Frant/Herman B. Leonard 
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policehre plans and nine non-police/fire plans had spikes in excess of 
three times current salary. We know of no jurisdiction in which salaries 
are adjusted downward sharply in years in which these spikes occur. 
Thus, the profile of total compensation in many of these plans is highly 
irregular,  and its variance  is  driven mainly by  variation  in pension 
accruals. It seems clear that even a tortuous story could not support 
the claim that these employees receive their marginal product  each 
year. 
The thirteen policehre plans with very large spikes are, not coin- 
cidentally, the thirteen plans with no vesting or with vesting of  more 
than twenty years. These plans are not markedly more generous than 
average in terms of  benefit  accrual rates.  The size of  these  spikes 
demonstrates the sensitivity of vesting accruals to the time of  receipt 
of  the pension. 
Among the non-policehre  plans  with very large  spikes, however, 
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caused by  some form of  secondary  vesting, generally  involving an 
interaction of age and service requirements. In figure 9.10, which shows 
the accrual profile for Kent County, Michigan, the story is typical. An 
employee at age 49 has a vested right to receive a full pension at age 
60. The following year, experience of 25 years qualifies the worker for 
immediate full retirement. The spike represents a complete acceleration 
of the right to full retirement. Acceleration need not be complete or 
dramatic,  however,  to produce large spikes. For instance, one plan 
with deferral to age 58, or to age 55 with 25 years, produces a spike 
at year 25 (for our illustrative worker, at age 50) in excess of 100 percent 
of current salary. 
9.5.3  Effect of Early Retirement Penalties and Accrual Ceilings 
Our intuition  was that early retirement penalties would not be of 
much importance. By  working for another year rather than taking an 
immediate pension, after all, one gains both a salary increase (real and 
nominal) and an increase in  the final average salary percentage. One 
loses a year’s pension, but many years in the future. We  thought that 
accruals would be significantly positive after reduced retirement age, 
more or less irrespective of the penalty. Even without large penalties 
for early retirement, it would seem that the standard increases in pen- 
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5- 
sion benefit entitlements  should  provide  a  substantial incentive for 
employees to work up to the year of normal retirement. 
The reduced retirement penalty generally has a much more important 
role than we anticipated in making accruals positive between the re- 
duced retirement date and the full retirement date. As  soon as the 
penalties stop (at the full retirement date), accruals tend to fall to near 
zero and then gradually drift downward. The growth of pension wealth 
caused by increases in final average salary percentage and in current 
salary tend to be about as much as the interest that would be due on 
the wealth to date, which means that the net accrual is about zero. 
Reductions in the penalty account for most of any positive accrual from 
year to year. And if pension wealth by this date is large (15 or 20 times 
age-25 salary at age fifty-five is not unusual), then staying another year 
to reduce the penalty  by  even a small percentage can yield  a large 
accrual. Of course, the larger the penalty, the larger the accruals over 
this period. 
To  illustrate the effect of early retirement penalties in maintaining 
the pension-induced  incentive to work in  the final years before full 
retirement, figure 9.11 shows the accrual profile for Chicago both with 
the early  retirement penalty  it  imposes (actual) and without  (hypo- 
thetical). Without the early retirement penalty, accruals fall essentially 
to zero after the retirement date (in the  absence of  a penalty,  this 
Chicago,  IL 
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would be age fifty-five for our illustrative worker). With no reduction, 
the increase in pension  wealth from salary increases and additional 
benefit formula accruals (offset by the one-year reduction in the pen- 
sion’s expected  length)  is just  enough  to provide  the  interest  that 
should be due on the existing balance-that  is, the  accrual for the 
year is essentially zero. With the penalty, the accruals remain positive 
up to the normal retirement date. Of  course the penalty reduces the 
size of the primary vesting spike and the early accruals that follow it. 
Thus, the system with a retirement penalty spreads the positive pen- 
sion accruals-the  pension-based inducements to keep working-more 
smoothly and over a longer time period. 
Ceilings on the benefit accrual rate have a significant effect in the 
other direction. If  they occur after the full retirement date, they typi- 
cally push the accruals as a multiple of age-25 salary from near zero 
to about -  1 ,  as in figure 9.11. 
9.6  Implications 
The patterns of pension wealth accruals that these plans display are 
puzzling. Since we have not attempted to develop a theoretical frame- 
work in which to evaluate efficiency, or to specify what employers’ 
goals might be  with respect to retention  incentives, we cannot say 
definitively that these plans are inefficient. The data, however, strongly 
suggest this. 
Lazear (1983) has noted that non-immediate vesting gives rise to an 
inefficiency. He suggests that the need to sort workers may provide an 
explanation, but one that is less than fully satisfying. Can one find a 
plausible explanation for plans, such as those in figure 9.8, that have 
several dramatic primary and secondary vesting spikes, or for those, 
as in figure 9.7, that are essentially nothing but a vesting spike?s 
To  argue that these are optimal contracts we must also explain the 
extraordinary sensitivity of some of these profiles to entry age. Figure 
9.12, which shows the accruals for Minnesota, for example, shows the 
same plan with entry ages of 25 and 30. The two versions show peaks 
at similar points, to be sure, but in markedly different ways. In the 
case of age-25 entry, there are dramatic spikes of about five times age- 
25 salary at ages 55 and 58. In the case of age-30 entry, we find a gradual 
buildup of accruals to age 55, followed by a drop, followed by another 
gradual increase through age 60. The highest point is barely three times 
age-25 salary, These profiles present radically different incentives to 
the two workers. At age 54, is the difference between age-25 entry and 
age-30 entry really significant enough to  justify this radical difference? 
Exploration of the theoretical implications of these data is certainly 
in order. It seems likely, though, that some of these features arise from 
factors that are difficult to model: the political economy of the work- 234  Howard L. Frantmerman B. Leonard 
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place, institutional rigidities, or simple accident. This in turn suggests 
that these plans as presently constituted may not be an efficient ex- 
penditure of public money. 
One  approach  to correcting this  would  be  to  simplify the  plans. 
Complex interactions of early retirement penalties, entitlements to pen- 
sion rights defined discontinuously in terms of  age and service, and 
other features of  some plans may have unintended consequences in 
terms of  accrual profiles and resulting incentives.  Simplifying plans 
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appropriate) incentives per dollar of required funding. Alternatively, 
one may note that incentives are much clearer if plans are on a defined 
contribution basis. Both workers and taxpayers could then see directly 
both the timing and the magnitude of the incentives provided, as well 
as their cost. In principle, any desired accrual profile could be achieved 
by varying contribution rates; in practice we would be very surprised 
if any defined contribution plan had a time profile similar to some of 
those shown here. Note that this in itself argues that some features of 
the accrual profiles of defined benefit plans are accidental. 
9.7  What Remains to Be Done? 
There are several areas in which further investigation of public sector 
plans is likely to be fruitful. First, one could simply expand the universe 
of plans examined to get a better statistical picture of public plans in 
general. We urge great care in doing so, however. Differences in plans 
are often more subtle than one would realize from a mere list of pa- 
rameters-whether  a plan permits vesting of  accelerated retirement 
rights, for instance. Examining a large number of plans properly is a 
very tedious task. 
Second, one could examine actuarial data for a number of plans to 
see how effective particular profiles actually are in achieving the in- 
centive effects one would hypothesize from looking at them. It is pos- 
sible-though,  we think, unlikely-that  workers do not really under- 
stand where plan spikes are. It is more likely that they have no way 
of accurately assessing the size of the spikes. 
Finally, we noted that many systems have several coexistent plans, 
with older employees  grandfathered under previous plans.  Such an 
arrangement provides an opportunity to examine the direction of change 
of plans over time. Is it simply random or are there consistent trends? 
Understanding this question  may  help  answer whether the process 
generating these patterns should be thought of as a market or a political 
one. 
9.8  Conclusion 
Pension payments are an important component of labor income in 
the state and local public sector. They differ dramatically across juris- 
dictions in form, in timing, in level, and in the incentives they provide 
workers. Some are so complex that their incentive patterns appear to 
have arisen more by accident than by design. They may also be too 
complex to be fully understood by workers.  This in itself may be a 
reason to simplify some of the more complicated plans. 236  Howard L. FrantlHerman B. Leonard 
Notes 
This research was conducted with  support from the National  Bureau  of 
Economic Research Program on Public Sector Payrolls. 
1. This  total  is  for the systems, rather than  the particular  plans we  are 
describing.  Many  of  the systems have  large  numbers of  employees  grand- 
fathered under previous  rules.  We  have  chosen to confine  ourselves to the 
version covering new employees. The figure also includes some state employees. 
2. We  calculated the value of the pension annuity as the value of an annuity 
for the expected remaining  life.  Strictly  speaking,  the correct value  is  the 
expected value over one’s lifetime. The difference is minor, however. 
3. For those plans with  no explicit provision,  we followed Arnold  1983 in 
assuming that adjustments average half of the CPI. 
4. It may be useful to emphasize that this “optimal year” is not the optimal 
year of retirement, simply the optimal year to begin receiving payments.  Cal- 
culating the optimal year of retirement  would be a daunting task indeed, es- 
pecially  since workers most likely  differ dramatically  in their  valuations  of 
leisure and perhaps in their other opportunities as well. We are not attempting 
here to provide a comprehensive account of local public employees’ decisions 
about mobility, but only to suggest how pensions  contribute to that picture. 
Thus, we  do not, for example, discuss Social  Security  except insofar as it 
explicitly affects the size of pension rights. 
5. Data were from a program developed by Douglas Phillips. We thank Gary 
Heaton for his assistance. 
6. This right is commonly called early retirement. The term can be confusing, 
however, because it is sometimes used to refer to departure with a vested right 
to pension later, or to unreduced retirement at an earlier age due to some age- 
service  combination.  To  avoid  ambiguity,  we  will  refer to reduced and full 
retirement. 
7. Not in all, though. Some would require him to be still working at age 55 
in order to exercise this option. 
8. Becker and Stigler 1975 offers a model of law enforcement and corruption 
in which the optimal compensation  schedule for an enforcer includes a large 
payment  at retirement  which  one loses if  one leaves  before retirement  age. 
While actual compensation plans do not mirror Becker and Stigler’s proposal 
exactly (in particular,  with  respect to “entrance  fees”), the resemblance  is 
suggestive and agrees with the intuition of some of our readers that pensions 
of this form serve as an organizational control mechanism. The difficulty with 
this  view  is that we  apparently do not  find  special pension  plans  in  other 
corruption-prone local government  jobs, such as building inspector or cashier, 
while we do find pensions of this form for fire fighters. We also find a strikingly 
similar form for U.S. military  pensions (see Leonard, chap. 3). When a dis- 
tinction is made, it seems to be not between enforcement and non-enforcement 
jobs, but between uniformed and non-uniformed. 
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Comment  Edward P.  Lazear 
Frant and Leonard do two things in their chapter on state and local 
pension plans. First and foremost, they provide a detailed description 
of the various pension accrual patterns that can be found in the ninety- 
four plans they examine. They do an admirable job of presenting these 
findings in a clear and careful way. Second, they attempt to draw some 
conclusions about the optimality of labor contracts. It is this second 
aspect that I find most troublesome. Most of my comments are directed 
there. For the most part, the next few pages will explore what can and 
cannot be learned from an examination of the differences in pension 
accrual patterns. 
The authors make the point that it is difficult to square the various 
pension accrual patterns with a simple story of optimal contracts. There 
is too much diversity in pension plans to conform to a simple story. 
Even if all plans were alike, it would be difficult to present a straight- 
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forward theory that would reconcile the discontinuous nature of pen- 
sion accrual. On the whole, I agree. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
claim that  the data they generate  are absolutely consistent with an 
optimal contracts story. But I stop short of admitting that the evidence 
they present speaks strongly to the issue of optimal contracts. There 
are a number of  reasons. 
First, because Frant and Leonard do not discuss what pensions are 
supposed to be doing, it is difficult to determine whether the plans they 
consider are efficient. Efficiency can only be  determined within the 
context of  a model. A hypothesis must be presented before it can be 
refuted; absent a raison d’stre, it is nonsensical to ask whether pensions 
accomplish their goals. The inability to make reason from the observed 
patterns is not sufficient evidence to reject any general statement about 
efficiency. An efficiency criterion must be presented. 
Specifically, the discussion does not define the choice variables over 
which efficiency is to be considered.  Some obvious possibilities are 
labor supply variables, for example, hours of work, age of retirement, 
and labor quality variables such as the level of effort and investment 
in human capital. Do the pensions they examine operate on all of these 
variables? For which ones are inefficient outcomes produced? 
Most of these questions are logical rather than empirical. A certain 
amount of evidence is needed before one can even construct a theory, 
and this paper provides that evidence. But it does not tackle the second 
task of  determining efficiency. For example, in  “Incentive Effects of 
Pensions” (Lazear 1985), I consider the effect of various pension pro- 
visions  on work effort, human capital, age of retirement and hours 
worked, and worker turnover. I conclude that many pension provisions, 
such as non-immediate vesting and pension plans that make the pension 
a function of  final salary, are inefficient with respect to those labor 
supply and human capital variables. Frant and Leonard document con- 
vincingly that non-immediate vesting of various types is prevalent in 
the public sector. As such, I conclude that they do in fact cause some 
inefficiencies. But that cannot be gleaned from the authors’ analysis. 
Does non-immediate vesting induce workers to work too many or too 
few years? How does it affect effort? I believe this chapter is comple- 
mentary with my theoretical analysis and welcome it. But I also believe 
that as a matter of style, the authors’ careful empirical work should 
not be coupled with loose statements about efficiency. This is partic- 
ularly troublesome in the policy implications sections. Nothing in chap- 
ter 9 tells us whether defined contribution plans are superior to defined 
benefit plans, for example. 
Another theoretical difficulty, which causes some minor empirical 
problems (discussed later), is that the pension is treated independent 
of wage compensation. Workers’ decisions are affected by their total 239  Incentive Structures of Local Public Pension Plans 
compensation, not merely by the pension part. It is important to rec- 
ognize the constraint on total compensation paid (even by a nonprofit 
organization) because the effects can be offset or exacerbated by the 
other component of  Compensation. This comes back to the issue of 
why there are pensions at all. That compensation is divided between 
pension and wage payments is unlikely to be a random event. Under- 
standing the effects of pensions requires that we understand simulta- 
neously the effects of wages. I am not arguing that the weird accrual 
patterns the authors find are likely to be offset by similar and opposite 
weird patterns in the wage profile. I merely claim that I do not know 
what to make of their evidence unless I examine it in context. 
A third point is that hoping to explain discrete phenomena is asking 
too much.  Few economic models are successful in this regard, even 
though discontinuities are common in the real world. This point is not 
specific to pensions, but occurs in other aspects of labor and product 
markets. For example, raises are discrete and sometimes quite large. 
It would be difficult to argue that marginal product takes discrete up- 
ward jumps  at these points.  Product  prices,  too, change discontin- 
uously. Consider, for example, the price of newspapers. (There are two 
components to price: the price to the reader and the price to the ad- 
vertiser. One may be smoother than the other. Similarly, the wage part 
of compensation may move more smoothly than the pension part.) 
Additionally, the amount of discontinuity that one observes depends 
on the unit of analysis. It is rare in labor economics that researchers 
are able to analyze data at the level of the firm. Usually what is reported 
is some average across a large number of firms or individuals. Generally, 
regression coefficients are presented and these average out the discon- 
tinuities. I do not suggest that Frant and Leonard have not performed 
a valuable service by discussing the variation across firms in accrual 
patterns. I merely point out that most results in labor economics (or 
in empirical economics in general) would be more discrete if researchers 
did not report results that are derived from averaging across a large 
number of individual units. Thus, the benchmark is different here. 
A final point on diversity is that there is no reason to presume that 
a market displaying a great deal of heterogeneity is inefficient. The fact 
that clothes come in many sizes and shapes does not imply that some- 
thing is necessarily wrong in that market. Similarly, pension plans may 
differ because workers differ in their savings desires, labor force par- 
ticipation behavior, and other assets and wealth, or because firms differ 
in their credibility and ability to raise capital. I do not suggest that 
these factors can explain the diversity of plan accrual patterns. I merely 
point out that one cannot tell the players without a scorecard. Without 
some clearer statement of  what pensions are doing, it is difficult to 
conclude that variance implies inefficiency. 240  Howard L. Frant/Herman B. Leonard 
Some Technical Points 
Failure to integrate wages with pensions leads to a minor technical 
mistake. The authors must select some date of retirement on which to 
base accruals. Since the pension that a worker receives is a function 
of final salary and years of service, it is necessary to know that date 
to compute the amount accrued at each point. Frant and Leonard select 
the optimal date of retirement, defined as the date at which the expected 
present value of pension flows is maximized. The problem is that the 
optimal date of retirement is not the date when pensions reach a max- 
imum. The date depends on the relation of the wage compensation to 
the alternative use of time as well. This is best seen by examining figure 
c9.1. 
The expected present value of pension benefits is a function of  age 
of retirement shown by the curve labeled EPV. The wage and value of 
leisure functions are labeled accordingly. They define T as the optimum 
date of retirement.  If  there were no pension  at all, T‘  would be the 
optimal date of retirement. With the pension, the true optimum is at 
T. T  falls short of  T because the worker must take into account that 
although his wage exceeds his alternative use of time, he loses pensions 
by continuing to work. If the value of leisure function were above the 
wage at T, then T  would lie to the left of T since it is total compensation 
and not merely one component of it that affects the retirement decision. 
The necessary conditions and algebra are spelled out in detail in my 
paper  “Pensions  as Severance Pay”  (Lazear  1983), but the point  is 
clear: Accruals depend on date of retirement, and that is a function of 
more than just the pension plan. 
The differences in  leisure value and wage rates across individuals 
can help account for different selected dates of retirement by workers 
who face the same pension plan. In fact, some identifying assumption 
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must be made in order to derive the effects of pension plans on retire- 
ment behavior. Most of the literature implicitly assumes that workers 
are randomly confronted with a pension plan and that all workers have 
the same tastes. That assumption will not work here. Since all workers 
within a firm or local government unit face the same plan, differences 
in retirement dates across individuals  must be caused by  something 
else. If it is variations in wage profiles and/or the value of leisure, then 
it will affect the estimates of the accrual patterns. I am not worried 
that this will have a major effect on Frant and Leonard’s findings, but 
the implicit assumptions should be made explicit. Additionally, since 
they assume a wage profile for the typical worker anyway, they can 
obtain the sensitivity of the computed optimal retirement date to vari- 
ations in the value of leisure function. My guess is that most of their 
results will be robust with respect to this kind of variation. 
A related issue is that Social Security payments affect the choice of 
retirement date. For many plans, this is not a problem because their 
workers do not participate in the Social Security program. But for those 
plans that are integrated with Social Security, the effects of ignoring it 
are likely to be important. This is especially so because many plans 
have offset provisions, which create a deviation between the amount 
paid by the employer as pension and the amount of retirement income 
received by  the worker.  For  some questions  of  efficiency, it  is the 
amount paid that is important. For others it is the amount received. In 
any event, Social Security offsets that kick in and out at various ages 
are likely to affect the spikes. Additionally, an examination of these 
provisions  might assist in  understanding what  pensions are actually 
doing and why the spikes are there in the first place. 
A few minor empirical issues are worth noting. First, it is not clear 
whether the wage growth figures reported are actually earnings or stated 
annual salaries. Since older workers suffer health problems, there often 
is a large deviation between the two. The growth rate that should be 
used is the one corresponding to the definition of income on which the 
plan is based.  Most plans in the private  sector are based  on actual 
earnings, often including overtime.  If  this is so, then the growth of 
actual earnings should be used. This definition should be spelled out 
in the chapter. 
Second, it would be useful to perform the simulations with different 
salary levels. In my “Pensions as Severance Pay” (1984), I found some 
progressivity in the pension plans. Some have suggested an insurance 
interpretation of those plans. More evidence on the nature of the pro- 
gressivity, especially from the public sector, would be welcome. 
Finally, if  the data are available, it would be informative to relate 
the various accrual patterns to the characteristics of the workers em- 
ployed in those firms. The proportion female, black, the average salary 242  Howard L. Frantmerman B. Leonard 
levels, and tenure on separation are obvious candidates. Although some 
endogeneity  is  clearly present, even simple correlations might  shed 
some light. 
In  sum, this chapter does a fine job of presenting a considerable 
amount of information on pension accrual patterns. It is likely to stim- 
ulate more thinking on why pensions take these particular forms. It 
also may provide some clues to the causes of  the growth of  pensions 
during the past thirty years. 
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